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At 2200 hours 4 Aug 43 orders 
were given for a force comprising 
elements of 2nd Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, 12th Tank Regiment, and 
this unit to capture the approaches 
to ADERNO [Adrano], lying north of 
the REGALBUTO—ADERNO road, 
and astride the TROINA road from 
the line of the river Disottaditroina to 
the river Simeto.
This unit moved to an assembly point 
below REGALBUTO (H5493) where 
unit orders were given at 0340 hours 
5 Aug 43. The plan was for this unit 
to recce lines of advance for the 
tanks and infantry to the high ground 
dominating the river Simeto. Upon 
capture of this feature (H6897 and 
H6997) the unit was to recce the 
DEMAZZO plain and SIMETO river 
for exploitation possibilities. Forming 
up place - river bed H6497; 2 Troop 
left, 3 Troop right, 1 and 4 Troops 
reserve; one sec anti-tank guns with 
each forward troop; Start time 0600 
hours.
The route f rom REGALBUTO 
northeast to the forming up place 
along the railway line and across the 
SALSO river and improvised road, 
went through vicious difficulties for 
both tracks and wheels. It called for 
the greatest driving skill to negotiate 
them in darkness.
2 Troop was first across the start line, 
good progress was made as harassing 
fire was light and no substantial 
resistance was encountered until 
the Troop reached the immediate 
area of the objective. One despatch 
rider was shot and captured when 
caught between the supporting anti-
tank guns and the forward wave of 
carriers. Harder fighting developed as 
closer search disclosed many snipers 
and machine gun posts remaining 
on the high ground to our left flank 
after our forward elements had gone 
through.
By 0740 hours “2 Troop” carrier 
sections had found good ground on 
the lower slopes of the objective, to 
the south and southwest and dug 
in under mortar and machine gun 
fire. A patrol was also sent south to 
CARCACI, where Troops had been 
observed, with orders to hold fire until 
definite identification was made. The 
troop commander felt this might be 
the left flank of 78th Division although 
the report early that morning indicated 
they were astride the road a few miles 
east of REGALBUTO. Our patrol 
made contact and it proved to be in 
fact a company of the London Irish, 
78th Division, which had reached 
CARCACI almost simultaneously with 
our arrival 700 yards to their north.
One squadron tanks carrying one 
company infantry had advanced 
behind the two reconnaissance 
troops. No real resistance was met 
by 3 Troop on the right due to the 
junction between 2 Troop and 78th 
Division. 3 Troop was able to move 
left and engage the enemy previously 
mentioned on the high ground north 
of the TROINA road. One section of 1 
Troop assisted in this fighting as the 
enemy, who were apparently being 
reinforced possessed heavy fire 
power in machine guns and Mortars. 
Many casualties were inflicted on the 
enemy who, it was later established, 
included a number of paratroops.
On the basis of 2 Troop reports 
the tanks effectively shelled the 
objective at 0830 hours. The tanks 
also supported the 3 Troop fighting 
with their guns.
Liaison was kept with the London Irish 
whose observation post in CARCACI 
gave observation along the east 
slopes of tour objective. The enemy 
was moving to the top of the feature 
and his strength was judged to be 
one strong company. At 1015 hours 
he made a strong effort to drive us 
from our positions and cut the road 
between the Canadians and British. 
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Up to 40/50 of the enemy exposed 
themselves at one time to our fire. 
Thanks to our good positions, our 
strong fire power and support from the 
3 inch mortars of the London Irish, his 
attack failed. The enemy was driven 
back over the ridge and it was judged 
that 2 Troop could then have taken 
the objective. However, the infantry 
and tanks were moving up and the 
tanks had been given a free hand to 
shell the hill. 2 Troop therefore held 
their ground and exchanged light fire 
with snipers, a few of whom again 
got on the crest and forward slopes 
of the feature. At about 1400 hours 
the tanks and infantry assaulted the 
height and occupied it with negligible 
difficulty. They had already occupied 
the high ground to the west, covered 
by 3 Troop. 
The enemy mortar fire brought down 
on the positions of the squadron 
during the forenoon was as usual 
heavy and accurate. The anti-tank 
section behind 2 Troop was driven 
from its position which offered little 
cover, with two serious casualties 
who were removed by 2 Troop. 
One proved fatal. The mortars were 
silenced by 1100 hours and did not 
show up seriously again until the 
objective was taken, when tanks and 
infantry suffered a heavy barrage. 
By 1400 hours 1 Troop was under 
way on the unit’s second task of 
reconnoitering for exploitat ion 
information. The road through 
the DIMAZZO plain and also the 
surrounding flats were extremely 
open. It seemed foolhardy to put 
vehicles on ground so very exposed 
to heavy weapons on the ADERNO 
side of the SIMETO river. The 
commanders of 1 and 2 Troops made 
a dismounted recce of the east side 
of the captured height with a view to 
working through to the north of the 
plain. However the ground was very 
difficult and cut by natural obstacles 
which were proof even against 
carriers. This recce also found that 
the enemy driven from PERRIATO 
height had retired up the valley in 
sizable numbers and apparently 
in some disorder. It was decided 
that 1 Troop would remain forward 
and discover what it could towards 
carrying out its task.
At 1730 hours, 1 Troop provoked the 
enemy into disclosing a gun position. 
The plan was to deliberately draw fire 
by exposing the armoured car section 
on the plain. This had early success. 
The patrol came under heavy anti-
tank gun fire and manoeuvred back 
to cover while the enemy was kept 
out of action by fire from the support 
cars. The gun position was pinpointed 
at M.R.691967. A 6-pounder anti-
tank gun under command, quickly 
engaged the target and scored two 
direct hits. It was later confirmed that 
one shot had pierced the plate and 
put the crew out of action. The other 
hit disabled the gun itself.
This unit and 2nd Brigade Infantry 
and the tanks maintained patrols 
to cover the captured area until the 
Royal 22e Régiment came forward 
late at night and exploited beyond the 
position then established.
Casualties for the day other than 
those already mentioned were 
negligible. One mortar casualty in 
1 Troop was the only one requiring 
evacuation. There were numerous 
vehicle casualties but they were 
repairable within the unit except in 
one case. This was a carrier which got 
a direct hit by mortar and after limping 
through the day’s action spent two 
or three hours in workshops before it 
was again a runner.
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A feature of the fighting was the good 
effect of burning out buildings and 
lighting the grass and brush with 
tracer ammunition. In a number of 
instances this drove out enemy who 
could then be picked off by ordinary 
small arms fire.
A novel handling of the 2-inch mortar 
also developed. The Commander 1 
Troop Armoured Reconnaissance 
Car Section acted as an observation 
post, gave corrections by wireless 
telephone to Commader 2 Troop 
who gave corrections by flag signals 
to the mortar carrier. The effect was 
excellent. (This was the same mortar 
which knocked out an enemy tank 
crew when this unit made contact 
with the enemy at NISSORIA on 23 
Jul 43. No.1 on the mortar is Corporal 
Norm Craig.
The ragged condition of the enemy 
when knocked off our objective 
was shown by the fact that German 
orders were still coming over the 
line telephone 15 minutes after the 
capture. 
The action of the Squadron on this 
occasion was the first in which 
suitable country for manoeuvre had 
been found and that the Squadron 
had worked well and efficiently was 
well indicated by the hearty thanks 
which Major Duck received from 
Lieutenant-Colonel Booth, officer 
commanding 12th Canadian Tank 
Regiment, under whose command 
the Squadron was working for the day. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Booth expressed 
a desire that a Recce Squadron 
work with his tanks on all possible 
occasions, as our vehicles were able 
to seek out information for the tanks 
and were able to get the information 
back in time to be of use to the tanks 
and also to the infantry. All members 
of the Squadron were well pleased 
with their work, since it was the first 
time in which they had found suitable 
country in which to operate and that 
they could operate, if the ground was 
suitable, was a fact that gave all a 
feeling of pleasure and confidence.
E d i t o r ’ s  N o t e :  S h o r t  f o r m s , 
abbreviations and acronyms have 
been written out in full but the 
document is otherwise unchanged 
from the original.
Canadian  t roops  pass  through 
Regalbuto, 6 August 1943.
A Humber Mk.IV armoured car of the 4th 
Princess Louise Dragoon Guards passes 
the wreckage of a German staff car, near 
Limosano, Italy, 26 October 1943.
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Recent employment of field and field 
and medium artillery on a Divisional 
basis has brought forward many 
complimentary remarks for the 
“Gunners” from all quarters. I would 
like Commanding Officers to assure 
that all ranks Royal Canadian Artillery 
Headquarters Royal Canadian Artillery, 
1st Canadian Division
31 July 1943
Officer Commanding,
1st Canadian Field Regiment
2nd Canadian Field Regiment
3rd Canadian Field Regiment
7 Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery
1st Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment
2nd Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
MEMO TO COMMANDING OFFICERS
and Royal Artillery know that their 
support has been timely and effective 
and is greatly appreciated by the 
Infantry.
Re fe r r ing  par t i cu la r l y  to  the 
concentrations and barrages prior to 
the capture of AGIRA, Commander 30 
Corps and General Officer Command 
1s Canadian Division have both 
expressed their admiration of our 
application of fire under somewhat 
difficult circumstances. I would 
like all ranks to know that I am 
highly pleased, not only with the 
fire on large scale, but also with 
the countless spirited independent 
actions conducted by observation 
posts, also the efforts put forward 
by Signal personnel, Drivers and 
Gunners which on many occasions 
required great resourcefulness and 
bravery.
The action of the anti-tank and light 
anti-aircraft batteries has also been 
highly commendable and they have 
both required the confidence of 
the Formations of which they are 
presently under command.
Much still remains to be done to 
improve drill for deployment, etc., and 
I would like to stress once again the 
great need for Gunners to increase 
the volume of Counter Battery and 
tactical information to be passed 
back to this Headquarters. Our 
responsibilities do not end with firing 
guns and every counter measure 
which lies within our resources must 
be effectively used.
       [signed]
(A. Bruce Matthews) Brigadier,
Commander, Royal Artillery
1st Canadian Division
A 25-pounder gun of the 7th Battery, 
2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian 
Artillery in action near Nissoria, Sicily 
in July 1943.
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At this moment the combined armed 
forces of the United States, Great 
Britain, and Canada under the 
command of General Eisenhower 
and his deputy, General Alexander, 
are carrying the war deep into the 
territory of your country. This is the 
direct consequence of the shameful 
leadership to which you have been 
subjected by Mussolini and his 
Fascist regime. Mussolini carried you 
into this war as the satellite of a brutal 
destroyer of peoples and liberties.
Mussol in i  p lunged you into a 
war which he thought Hitler had 
already won. In spite of Italy’s great 
vulnerability to attack by air and sea, 
your Fascist leaders sent your sons, 
your ships, your air forces, to distant 
battlefields to aid Germany in her 
attempt to conquer England, Russia 
and the world.
This association with the designs 
of Nazi-Controlled Germany was 
unworthy of Italy’s ancient traditions 
of freedom and culture-traditions to 
which the peoples of America and 
Britain owe so much.
Your soldiers have fought not in the 
interests of Italy but for Nazi Germany, 
they have fought courageously, 
but they have been betrayed and 
abandoned by the Germans on the 
Russian front and on every battlefield 
in Africa from El Alamein to Cape Bon.
Today Germany’s hopes for world 
conquest have been blasted on 
all fronts. The skies over Italy are 
dominated by the vast air armadas of 
the United States and Great Britain. 
Italy’s sea coasts are threatened 
by the greatest accumulation of 
British and Allied sea power ever 
concentrated in the Mediterranean.
The forces now opposed to you are 
pledged to destroy the power of 
Nazi Germany--power which had 
ruthlessly been used to inflict slavery, 
destruction and death on all those 
who refuse to recognize the Germans 
as the master race.
The sole hope for Italy’s survival 
lies in honourable capitulation to the 
overwhelming power of the military 
forces of the United Nations.
If you continue to tolerate the Fascist 
regime which serves the evil power 
of the Nazis, you must suffer the 
consequences of your own choice. 
We take no satisfaction in invading 
Italian soil and bringing the tragic 
devastation of war home to the Italian 
people. But we are determined to 
destroy the false leaders and their 
doctrines which have brought Italy to 
her present position.
Every moment that you resist the 
combined forces of the United 
Nations--every drop of blood that 
you sacrifice--can serve only one 
purpose: to give the Fascist and Nazi 
leaders a little more time to escape 
from the inevitable consequences of 
their own crimes.
All your interests and all your traditions 
have been betrayed by Germany and 
your own false and corrupt leaders; 
it is only by disavowing both that a 
reconstituted Italy can hope to occupy 
a respected place in the family of 
European Nations. 
The time has now come for you, the 
Italian people, to consult your own 
self-respect and your own interests 
and you own desire for a restoration 
of national dignity, security and 
peace. The time has come for to 
decide whether Italians shall die for 
Mussolini and Hitler---or live for Italy 
for civilization.
Text of President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill’s 
message to the Italian people 
Delivered 16th July 1943
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill at 
the Casablanca Conference, January 
1943.
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Lieutenant-Colonel B.M. Hoffmeister, commanding officer of the Seaforth 
Highlanders of Canada, leads his battalion up a Sicilian hill, August 1943.
Library and Archives Canada PA 132779
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